邹恒甫：4万亿投资利于建设中国和谐社会

　　一只蝴蝶在太平洋对面扇动翅膀，将引起另一端的风暴。美国的金融危机，尽管对中国经济冲击并不象传说中的“蝴蝶效应”那样可怕，但系于全球经济一体化，中国已很难在全球经济低迷时独善其身。各国政府联合救市，将对2009年的世界经济带来什么样的影响？此次金融危机将真的如有些专家所说是“国际经济秩序重新洗牌”的机会吗？中国又将在明暗未定的全球经济浪潮中如何走向？

　　邹恒甫简介：哈佛大学经济学博士，世界银行研究部研究员。


　　邹恒甫：4万亿投资利于建设中国和谐社会




　　《小康》： 美国的金融危机，各国政府联手救市，是否能有效阻止全球经济下滑？您将如何预测全球经济在2009年的走势？

　　邹恒甫：美国出现金融危机，或者说经济上出现一些问题，是正常的现象，我不认为各国政府有必要下这么大力气去救，或者说，能够救得了这次的经济问题。因为这是一个经济周期的问题，是经济规律的一部分。经济向上或向下受它自身的各种因素约束，当然外力也会带来直接的影响。比如说，战争，石油涨价，能源危机或者地震这类的自然灾害。但如果希望通过财政政策或者货币政策来解决一个经济周期的问题，目前我们还没有成功的例子。

　　我认为2009年，美国还将继续在它的经济周期里进行调整。


　　《小康》：奥巴马作为新任总统，其经济思维与政策预期将对美国经济带来什么样的影响？

　　邹恒甫：这是一个比较有趣的现象，我们经常说共和党派会比较保守一些，而民主党派则相对激进，但从以往的历史中，我们可以看到共和党当政的时候，举例来说，里根，小布什，他们是共和党人，但他们往往会制造财政赤字；而民主党当政的时候，却更懂得如何经营财政，使得国家财政剩余。所以，我觉得作为民主党派的奥巴马先生作为美国的新任总统，应该也会传袭他们党派在经济上的作风。

　　同时，我也注意到以前小布什批准的7000亿救市资金，现在用途上好象有所改变。美国政府决定转变这笔由布什总统10月3日签署的救市资金的用途，不再收购银行的不良资产。美国的财政部长保尔森也表示了他们可能会将救市资金更多地放在消费者身上，这样可以通过支持消费者融资的方式促进消费，帮助金融市场和美国经济走出困境。

　　 这也就是当时救市之初的争论“救穷人”还是“救富人”，现在看来美国政府选择维护老百姓的经济利益。因为当大家手里有了钱，敢于消费，才能够使整个经济体活跃起来。

　　


　　《小康》：在过去的十来年里，中国经济以出口为导向，对美国市场依赖比较大。2009年，中国与美国的经济关系将产生什么样的变化？

　　邹恒甫：中国经济结构对出口的依赖过大，这本身就存在一定的问题。中国是一个人口大国，我们应该把就业和经济增长放在第一位。我们经常会谈到拉动内需，刺激消费，但在这样的建议前，我们得首先明白老百姓手头有多少可以花的钱。有数据说，今年城镇居民可支配收入的实际增长是7%，而去年是12%，再加上一个不太明确的经济预期，所以，老百姓是不敢去花钱的。内需还包括一个投资需求，这就需要我们考虑4万亿投资的项目能够解决一定的就业问题。

　　其实，对于4万亿投资，已经引起了许多争议，比如投资各行业的比例。我在想，政府是否可以考虑多在民生问题上加大力度？拿教育、医疗与养老保险这三项来说，我看到的资料数据是30年来，我们共投入1700亿元不到，只占基础设施的1/6，占GDP的1%，从这个比例上来说，我们的社会福利工作还是需要再加大投入。我在世界银行工作，了解的数据是：美国对这三项的投入一般是占GDP18—24%，加拿大是36%--46%，而北欧国家则更多，高达40%--50%。我们中央提倡的是建设和谐社会，那如何建设呢？这需要消除贫富的两极分化，需要加大国民的福利工程。我想，此次美国引发的金融危机引发全球经济的放缓，可能正是中国在经济上加大建设和谐社会的机会。



　　《小康》：此次的金融危机将引发世界经济秩序的重新洗牌吗？中国又将处于什么样的位置？是否有比较积极的机会？

　　邹恒甫：我也听说过有人说此次美国的金融危机可能会使美元失去在国际货币的本位制地位，也有说欧元或许会取替美元，甚至说中国人民币也是一个机会的。但据我并不这么认同，第一，美国经济本体非常健康，他们完全有实力解决这个经济周期问题。这次的金融危机有人将其与发端于1929年，1932年恶化的经济大萧条作比较，我认为不恰当。这次的金融危机远远没有那样的破坏性，我们只能说是经济周期中的一个阶段recession（衰退）,而不是depression（大萧条）。

　　对于有传言说美国可能会通过印刷美元来救市的说法是不可信的。因为美国的联储主席是完全独立的，他会强调将通货膨胀控制在8%，因为美国老百姓不允许有再大幅度的涨价，同时如果让掠夺其他国家的财富来为美国买单，那美元在国际货币体系中的大权旁落是美国政府不可能接受的。

　　恰恰相反，欧元一直在贬值，我不认为欧元能有什么大的作为，尤其没有英国与俄罗斯的加入，是后劲不足。对于中国，我想确实三十年来，我们中国经济取得了很大的进展，人们的生活也发生了翻天覆地的变化，但要说到取替美元，成为国际经济中的老大，这太夸张。我希望大家还是脚踏实地的比较好，不要因为外媒的一些赞美词语蒙蔽了双眼。



　　《小康》：有专家认为，中国可能在此次危机中进入美国抄底，您认为呢？同时，如果中国在全球资源价格下挫的时候进行投资，是什么样的机会？

　　邹恒甫：说到去国外金融市场抄底，那我想首先得问自己几个问题。为什么要去抄底？是不是符合金融和银行的发展规划和前途？然后去自身对于国际金融企业来说，有没有比较优势？对它的资产评估、管理和在那些国家的经营，自己公司有没有优势说可以比他们做得更好？其实这次中国的金融机构免于受难，很大程度上源于比较保守，因为对于金融产品以及在管理上不是很具竞争力，所以，并没有太多地参与到国际金融市场，也避免了一场风暴。

　　 对于资源，我想这是一个可能。我们的中投、中石化可以根据自己的情况考虑目前跌低的石油、矿产资源，煤炭黄金等。但是国际期货市场波动很大，如果在信息上没有一定的优势那就成为一种赌博。




　　《小康》：如果要打造一个经济强国，中国目前还需要在哪些方面努力？

　　邹恒甫：我想中国要成为经济强国还有很长的一段路要走。诺贝尔经济学奖获得者克鲁格曼在1994年就说：“东亚的经济增长模型，不可能持续”，当时他这个话是针对“亚洲四小龙”的。为什么？因为我们8%—9%的GDP增长其中75%耗费的是人力和物力。而美国GDP的70%是以技术创新作为经济增长点的，这样才可能做到持续性。

　　我们怀有打造经济强国的雄心是好的，但我们还需要脚踏实地的改变我们目前的经济模型，那就是应该进行技术创新，通过技术进步促进经济的发展。



　　《小康》：中央在经济下滑的时候，在财政政策与货币政策上都采取了大动作。特别提出十大措施来刺激内需，请问，您认为这些措施将会达到既定目标吗？也就是拉升二个GDP的百分点，保证8%-9%的增长率？

　　邹恒甫：在这个问题中，我有点不明白，为什么一定要追求8%—9%的增长率。美国以4%的增长率也能做得很好，为什么我们中国一定要高位运行？其实只要是有效的增长，我认为5%就已经足够好。

　　在4万亿的投资中，我们比较高兴地是许多是投建民生工程，这是好的。但是否还需要加大投资来拉动GDP的增长，这还是一个需要商量的问题。三十年来我们一直靠投资拉动GDP，但现在好象很难持续下去。一旦需求稍稍发生变化，我们立即就发现各个行业到处都是过剩产能，而这些过剩的产能早晚会变成银行的坏账。

　　在过去的几年中，国内消费只占GDP的35%，而发达国家则几乎超过了70%。为了刺激国内需求，政府首先应该增加民间开支，改善社保体系，让老百姓放心花钱，尽快把国内的家庭消费从35%这样一个超低的比率提高上来。

　　对于解决就业压力，我认为可以发展服务业。许小年老师曾在一个会议上指出这一点，我非常赞同。2007年，中国的服务业占GDP的比重不到40%，而美国是 80%以上，就连印度也是50%。这就是为什么发达国家GDP增长3%却能很好地解决就业问题，而我们增加10%还感觉就业有压力。我们应该从从固定资产投资推动的增长尽快转向服务业，这样就可以在一个较低的GDP增长速度上同样也能够实现充分就业。






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　　秦帝国兴亡人主惟一


　　邹恒甫


　　1997年10月


　　专制独裁统治赖一人之治驭能力。而历代文人论治，众说纷纭，遍及儒，法，道，墨，阴阳五行，不中要害。更有贾谊之论秦亡：仁义不施，而攻守之势异也。似乎仁义不施必亡国；或陆贾之双规：汤武逆取而顺守之，文武并用，长久之术也。凡此种种，全乃专制独裁统治下文武大臣和天下苍生无可奈何之乞求也！


　　Of Monocracy


　　By Zou Heng-fu


　　The rise and fall of a monocracy hangs crucially upon the monarch’s prowess, or the lack thereof, to run the state on his own terms, and in his own right. Simple as it seems, this observation has escaped, through the ages, generations of scholars of statecraft; for they have looked elsewhere, and have drawn, for an elucidation, on Confucian, Legalist, Taoist, and Mohist doctrines, as well as theories of Yin, Yang and the Five Elements, only to have missed the point and spawned confusion. Jia Yi of Han Dynasty, for one, had attributed the demise of Qin Dynasty to the benevolence withheld from the ruled, and to the brutality imposed thereupon, which eventually tipped the balance against the emperor, in his war to quell the domestic rebellion. Tyranny, in Jia Yi’s opinion, had appeared to be the undoing of a tyrant. Lu Jia, his contemporary, had proposed, on the other hand, a dual strategy for the establishment, and perpetuation, of a monocracy. A wise emperor or an emperor-to-be, must, à la King Tang of Shang Dynasty or King Wu of Zhou Dynasty, seize power by eliminating his opponents, and then sustain reign by accommodating his subjects. Such a dual strategy, according to Lu, is a recipe for an enduring monocracy. All these flawed attempts, on the part of scholars, to shed light on statecraft, have epitomized the helpless situation of people under the monocracy, be they high ranking civil and military officials, or the nation’s rank and file, who, cowered into submission, have had no choice but to beg benevolence of an emperor.


　　汉宣帝曾言，吾家治天下，自有不可外道之家法（霸王道杂之）。此乃蠢愚之极时自欺意淫梦语罢了，权可玩弄温顺之人臣。汉室后裔，或有一二人才济沛公之资哉？吾观古今中外的专制历史，惟有一元论：亡国兴国乃独裁一人之经验，权术和智力。此只可意会，不可言传身教。


　　As regards the secret to reign over a state, King Xuandi of Han Dynasty once proclaimed that he had acquired some hard-earned statecraft (supposedly a mixture of rule by force and rule by benevolence), but was not to disclose it to anyone except the Crown Prince himself. This was nothing but deceptive, delusional and delirious rigmarole at its stupidest, a trick played on ministers to keep them in line for as long as he could. Among the descendants of Duke of Pei, who later became King Gaozu of Han Dynasty, did there ever live a single offspring, including King Xuandi, who might hold a candle to his ancestor? Nay! A sweeping survey of history of dictatorships, both domestic and abroad, points to a monistic conclusion: To lead a monocracy nation into prosperity or peril is the autocrat’s distinctively personal experience, exclusively dependent on his idiosyncratic statecraft and intellect, which, not being amenable to teaching by precept or example, could only be inspired serendipitously.


　　览古乘，秦始皇鞭笞天下威振四海；而秦二世胡亥则不能扫除草隶之人迁徙之徒而国亡身灭。若秦始皇多有春秋十年廿载，纵有千万陈吴项刘也无法动秦始皇猛虎苛政之毫发，哪用施仁义道德！此正合旧谚矣：专制独裁乃最坚固而又最脆弱之政治和治理制度。此道理适用于一国家，一朝代，一组织，一公司，一家庭，“放之四海而皆准”。

　　Many ancient books extant to this day chronicled the great conquests made by the First Emperor of Qin Dynasty who had, by his military prowess, ravaged “all the land under heaven” and commanded “homage from the four seas”. Also on record, and by striking contrast, was the doom of Qin Dynasty presaged by the death of Hu Hai, his son and the Second Emperor of Qin Dynasty, who lost battles against the insurrectional armies, composed of downtrodden migrants and led by such as Chen Sheng, Wu Guang, Liu Bang and Xiang Yu. Had the First Emperor lived to reign another couple of dozen years, his tyrannical rule, said to be fiercer than a tiger, would have remained the Rock of Gibraltar, even if he had to combat tens of thousands of Chen’s, Wu’s, Liu’s and Xiang’s. Scarcely had he any use for benevolence, virtue and justice to shore up his rule. This is exactly what is meant by an old saying that tyranny is the strongest, but also the weakest, regime of political governance, a truth applicable to a family, a corporation, an organization, a dynasty, a nation, and for that matter, a truth “universally applicable.”


　　秦杂戎翟，德兼暴戾，襄公侯立。

　　更郊祭天地，尊崇宝鸡；文公逾陇，徂攘夷狄。

　　穆公政益，国固兵犀，始同诸侯雌雄计。

　　继献公，赢政六国系，天助时济？


　　万世之业磐逦，何一世既没九鼎移？

　　叹陆贾书生，呼唤仁义；文武攻守，胡亥岂及？

　　借年始皇，刘项万亿，谁敢作祟乱天地？

　　说秦史，帝国兴亡否，人主惟一。


　　(Poems are generally non-renderable. Hence, no English rendition is provided.)

　　 评曰：

　　 专制独裁乃最坚固而又最脆弱之政治和治理制度！所谓坚固者，以肉体消灭为威慑，以名分恩惠为利诱，敢不服从绝对之权力？何乐而不跟风投机？诗人所惑者，纳什均衡可解释也。举国欲狂，何耻裸奔？所谓脆弱者，“亢龙有悔”，相互倾轧而人人自危必致持续高压难以为继也，宜乎土崩瓦解！人治之弊显矣。

　　


　　Comments on the poem:

　　Tyranny is the strongest, but also the weakest, regime of political governance! It is the strongest regime; because, by threatening with corporal destruction, it cows everyone into submission to its absolute power; and because, lured by positions, statuses and other favors it is ready to bestow, hardly anyone can refrain from being opportunistic and obsequious. Whatever has puzzled the poet could find a decent explanation in terms of Nash Equilibrium. When the whole nation is going insane, streakers will streak unashamedly. It is also the weakest regime though; because the tyrannical strength, having already reached its climax, can move nowhere except downward; because in a tyrannical society characterized by internal strife and insecurity, both developed to a certain point, the heretofore suppression cannot persist without causing the whole regime to crash and collapse! The drawbacks inherent in the rule by men cannot be more obvious.


　　 殊为可悲者，近世为政治需要一味褒扬秦始皇而造神，忝列史家者曲学阿世，为论证“伟大的导师，伟大的领袖，伟大的统帅，伟大的舵手”万岁鼓与呼。此非一人一事之谬也，国民为沉重历史负担形格势禁所养成根深蒂固之劣根性也。然则“读史早知今日事”有破路径依赖之法否？余慨然答曰：有！无它，惟民主与科学之理念耳！既倡民主自由之理性觉醒，又行和谐共生之科学机制。


　　It is extremely lamentable that the First Emperor of Qin Dynasty was in modern times being lauded and apotheosized for political purposes; it is also extremely lamentable that many of our scholars, bending their principles to curry political favors in a way unworthy of historians, have beaten the drum and kicked up a row for another apotheosis to justify for Mao the four designated titles, namely, the Great Mentor, the Great Leader, the Great Commander, and the Great Helmsman. These absurdities do not merely emerge as a result of an isolated individual erring on his own, or as a result of an isolated incident gone awry. The blame for them can be laid on the ingrained and inveterate prejudice of a people burdened with long history. Can’t we break off this path-dependence, if we have studied history in such a way that we know how to predict future from past? With feeling, I want to answer in the affirmative. The solution lies in nothing but democracy and science. The solution lies in the rationality revival based on democracy and freedom, and lies in the scientific mechanism based on harmony and symbiosis.


　　正是：


　　清风识字乞雅量，刘项无书有匪魂。

　　分田分地空欢喜，原来黎庶不是人。

　　(Poems are generally non-renderable. Hence, no English rendition is provided.)

　　

　　美国迎接一个新的自由主义秩序

　　

　　万维读者网 作者: 刘伯松 2008-11-28 12:05:21

　　Peter Beinart著

　　刘伯松编译

　　1968年8月28日，上万人集中在芝加哥的格兰公园（Grant Park）抗议选择总统候选人的民主党全国代表大会，市长Richard Daley警告他们不要闹事，并拒绝他们游行准字，但他们反战情绪激烈，不理警告，结果发生警民冲突，大量警察高喊“杀杀杀”冲向他们，后来有人称之“警察暴动”。但在电视机面前观众非常不满示威者：把他们统统抓进监牢吧！

　　在此之前，民主党曾在9次总统选举中胜选7次，但从此以后，它在10次总统选举中败选7次之多！——尼克松-福特（2任）、雷根（2任）、布什（1任）和小布什（2任）。

　　40年后2008年11月4日，更多的人集中在同样的公园，他们是在同性同名的市长（前任市长的儿子）邀请前来庆祝奥巴马胜选的。这次警察在维持秩序，不再威胁他们。这次电视机面前观众不再反对他们，他们自己反而哭起来了。

　　同场不同景，显示美国自由主义的死亡和重生。当年人民把它当作动乱的象征，今天人民把它当作稳定的承诺。

　　追求秩序

　　在美国，政治倾向在于两个渴望之间：追求自由和追求秩序。一个世纪以前，美国历史的进步时期（Progressive Era），进步人士认为庞大工业垄断的资本主义把整个美国社会弄成一个弱肉强食、无法无天的丛林法则社会，只有最强者和最野蛮者才能生存。等到富兰克林?D?罗斯福（FDR，1933-1945）执政时，美国遭遇经济大萧条，人民叫苦连天，呼吁政府出来领导。于是，FDR抛出一个《新政》（New Deal），注入大量金钱挽救，保护失业者、退休者和长者；提高最低工资；管制工业、银行和金融机构等。当时保守派猛烈攻击政府，说它扼杀经济自由；但广大美国人民却感激政府的措施。他们没有感到不自由，反而增加了安全。从1930年中期到整个60年代，政府把秩序强加于经济整整35年，因此，FDR连任4次总统，最后死于位上。

　　这是自由主义的黄金时期。但上世纪60年代开始，二战结束后的一代，在经济繁荣当中长大，质疑FDR建立的有秩有序的社会。对南部的非裔来说，秩序等于种族隔离政策；对许多妇女来说，秩序等于困住在厨房；对每一个人来说，秩序等于遵从所有法规和风俗，衣着、吃喝、性爱等。于是他们反抗了，反战、民权、妇女、学生等运动纷纷出笼，赢个“动荡的60年代”！

　　于是，美国人把曾经给他们带来秩序的自由主义当作失序的根源了——对很多白人工人阶级来说，种族自由（民权）等于暴动和犯罪；性别自由等于离婚；文化自由等于不尊重家庭、教堂和国旗。于是来了共和党的尼克松总统和雷根总统，他们承诺一个新的保守主义秩序：文化的而不是经济，控制街头而不是控制市场。

　　一场经历40年的文化战争展开了。

　　衰弱中的保守主义

　　40年后，奥巴马胜选，保守主义死亡，自由主义重生。从意识形态来说，支持奥巴马这一代是上世纪60年代的连续。他们也相信种族平等、同性恋权利、性别平等主义、民权和个人自由选择。但40年后，这些理念不再是失序的根源。犯罪减少、暴动几乎不存在；性别平等主义已成主流意识，连佩琳也接受，连Richard Daley市长也与同性恋者并肩游行！文化上说，自由主义不再吓人了。不过，拥抱上世纪60年代思想的新一代是最守法、最不反抗的一代。保守派垄断40年的文化战争终于结束，因为上世纪60年代对抗的文化自由和文化秩序今天融合一起了。

　　今天美国人担忧的不是文化而是经济失序。如果自由主义在上世纪60年代结束，因为它追求的文化自由变成文化失序，那么今天保守主义的结束是因为它追求的经济自由变成经济失序。当1981年雷根上任时，他曾发誓彻底废除FDR半个世纪政府干预的经济自由的措施。于是，减税的减税，减控的减控，结果经济大饼越来越大。上世纪70和80年代美国资本主义的确带来繁荣；但也带来许多可怕的东西——解除管制的经济下，越来越少人有工作保障了，越来越多人交不起医疗费了，越来越多人退休金有问题了，富者越富，穷者越穷了，……。

　　从上世纪90年代开始，人们开始感到保守主义的经济议程和上世纪60年代自由主义的文化议程一样可怕。今天美国人对经济的觉悟就好像40年前对文化的觉悟一样——美国需要政府强行法律和秩序。

　　奥巴马要争取分秒

　　这是奥巴马的挑战，也是他的机会。如果他能够做到FDR所做的——稳定美国资本主义和减少它的野蛮性——他将会长期巩固民主党控制美国政治。奥巴马的确要面对布什遗留的大烂摊子，但他蛮有机会可把它扭转的。首先，大规模刺激经济、管制金融系统、巩固社会福利等。这些政策是不会分裂民主党的。他们对这些问题早已有共识。不过，共和党对这些问题则分成两派：一派不主张且反对政府干预经济，一派则主张且要求政府干预经济。如果奥巴马大胆推行恢复经济秩序，肯定会像当年FDR一样受到保守主义者如《华尔街日报》的猛烈攻击，但也肯定会受到工人阶级共和党人欢迎。他们是民主党新的自由主义秩序的主要组成部分。

　　奥巴马不需也无能马上把经济扭转过来；但他必须在2012年选举前在经济领域有所改善。因为今年63%投票者投票后说经济最重要，没有其他一项超过10%的！

　　在政治上，危机也可能是机会。如果奥巴马在他第一任期内，能够恢复一些经济秩序，重新激发美国资本主义，减少资本主义带来的诸多问题，同时，善用自己的魅力和沟通能力，像FDR和雷根那样与人民建立亲切关系，一个新的自由主义秩序必然生根的。同时，保守主义的议题，如减少高收入者税收、社会安全和医疗私有化等也随保守主义消失而消失。

　　一个新的共识

　　在一个两党制度里，如果不能说服一些持有不同意见的人，是无法构成多数的。但奥巴马的多数是相当巩固。过去往往为文化议题而闹得面红耳赤，今天这些问题——如同性恋、枪支控制、堕胎等——都随着上世纪60年代后长大成人而越来越不重要，它们不再分裂民主党了。同时，在外交政策上，也不像以往那么争执，也许由于伊拉克战争的经验，好战的白人工人阶级也不再相信武力可以解决一切了。比如，2004年选民投票后22%认为“道德价值”非常重要，19%说恐怖主义；今年，恐怖主义降至9%，而社会议题一个都没被列上！

　　其实奥巴马最头痛的问题不是文化战争，也不是外交政策，而是民族主义。在许多问题上，从全球暖化到移民到贸易到虐待，受过大学教育的自由主义者都希望能够把美国的经济、社会和价值与世界融合。比如，他们希望看到产品轻易过关、世界法则管制美国的污染、如何进行反恐战争，等等。他们相信为了得到更繁荣、更宽容，更安全，放弃一些主权是必要的。

　　但一些低层民主党党员却对移民、贸易和多元文化等不感兴趣，更不十分乐意接受。这些工人阶级民族主义者将会抗议外国威胁甚至夺取他们的自由。这是奥巴马新的自由主义秩序的暗礁。

　　但那是以后的事。如果奥巴马能够恢复经济秩序，民主党得益是长期的。40年前，自由主义是动荡美国的问题。今天，一个新的自由主义可能是它的解决。

　　格兰公园这一天的确与以往不同。

　　小结

　　共和党大败后，保守主义专栏作家纷纷在电视或在报刊极力强辩，美国仍然是一个“中间偏右”（centred-right）国家，保守主义未死；而自由主义专栏作家则提出相反论调，美国已成为一个“中间偏左”（centred-left）国家，自由主义重生。

　　其实美国历史学者Arthur Schlesinger（1917-2007）的循环论（cyclical theory）认为自由主义，强调公共利益（public interest）和保守主义，强调私有利益（private interest）是美国的“国家情绪”（national mood），时而倾向前者，时而倾向后者，不断在变化、在更新。今天“轮到”自由主义“当家”了，那些保守主义专栏作家仍然死抱住“中间偏右”不放，最后恐怕只是空梦一场。（取材于Peter Beinart, The New Liberal Order, TIME, 11-13-2008）

　　

　　其實，

　　中國學校裡再高的工資也就相當於美國商學博士在讀學生的獎學金和ＴＡ加ＲＡ的錢啊。

　　回到中國，還真需要對學問的真熱愛。

　　要趕上美國商學和經濟學？

　　讓我們再干一百年吧。

　　

　　
　　Thanksgiving slideshow
　　Nov 27, 2008

　　就北京大学新闻中心关于季羡林先生藏品通告答友人 (2008-11-06 08:46:12)

　　就在昨天，北京大学有关单位发布了有关季羡林先生藏品的第一份通告，真可谓一石激起千重浪。我的电话几乎被各家媒体打爆。这也可见，不许报道此事的宣传“禁令”或者是根本没有，或者是个别现象，反正根本就没有作用。无论多么不易，中国毕竟在进步。

　　我看了近来媒体对我的话的引用，不少是有欠准确的，很多是不完整的。我一再强调，我的意见以我的文字为准。对我的文字，我负完全的责任。因此，我就北京大学的通告，写了这些文字，作为我对媒体的答复。

　　北大的通告的内容，有几点，我还不能真切理解。

　　1，既然清点还在过程中，不妨等结果完全确定后再公布结果。时间确实是紧迫的，但是，程序、认真、责任更为重要。因为，这是引起了公众广泛关注的一件大事，并不是北大一家的事情。

　　2，既然是清点，应该明确告诉大家清点的依据和前提。至少应该公布：藏品的数量，藏品的内容，藏品的交接过程和经手、证明人员。我想，高等学府北大的工作人员应该是具有这样的起码意识的吧？不然，这样的清点，对于公众有什么意义呢？请放心，公众会思考。

　　3，就我所知道，季先生的藏品主要是两大部分。一大部分是先生原先收藏的藏品，就字画而论，先生收藏的底线是齐白石。但是，除此之外，至少还应该有一幅张大千的手卷，一幅姚茫父的手卷。这是当年“饶”（先生原话）给先生。先生自己都忘了，是我和已故李铮先生偶然发现的。这一批早就有详细目录，已经明确捐赠给北大了。这不应该有任何问题。另一部分则是先生近年来接受友人的馈赠，到底有没有目录？有没有数字？根据李玉洁女士的说法，是有一个数字的。那么，这也是她管理时的数字。她完成交接有不短的时间了，此后先生又收到过多少馈赠，是什么馈赠，有数字吗？有目录吗？这个数字和目录是怎么出来的呢？不把这些弄清楚，清点能有确实的意义吗？

　　4，北大通告说，季先生认为此次事情中的那些藏品都不是他的藏品。这就很有意思了？首先，季先生没有和我说过类似的话，这有录象为证；其次，季先生亲眼看过这些字画吗？就我所知，没有！那么，这是什么意思？第三，我相信，北大通告总是有依据的。那么，这个依据能够公布吗？这个依据是在什么情况下取得的呢？

　　5，现在看来，这批字画里肯定有伪作。但是，其中有没有真品？有的话，有多少？

　　这是一件大事，对于每一个关联人来讲，都是天大的事情啊！我相信，北大是会负责任地认真清查的。然而，北大终究是一家教学研究机构，是不可能也不应该替代司法部门的。既然相关人都提出希望司法介入，我认为，还是应该将此事交付司法部门独立调查。“组织”是重要的，但是，在今天的中国，哪道还需要、还应该由“组织”来包办一切吗？

　　北大之所以是北大，所凭借的不仅是它的学术和教育，恐怕更重要的是一种精神。这种精神，远远比任何有形的藏品珍贵。我想，先生也会同意我的这个意见的。

　　请大家象爱护自己的眼睛一样，爱护北大的精神！

　　这件事情正是检验北大精神的试金石！

　　北大，北大，请别让中国人失望！

　　北大，北大，绝对不会让中国人失望！——希望，这不仅仅是我的希望。


　　 北京大学学生学号8417036

　　全世界都看好美國經濟，

　　全都來美國抄底，

　　華爾街大漲。
　　

　　BREAKING

　　NEWS

　　

　　Dow's rally extends to 4th day, with blue-chip measure up 244 points at the

　　close; Nasdaq up 4.5%, S&P gains 3.4%. More soon.

　　
　　Black Friday: It has to be big, and bold
　　2:42pm: Given the severe slump in spending, discounts will be the deepest they've ever been this holiday season as merchants strive to stay alive in 2009. More
　　Retailers' holiday shopping list
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　　Dow gains for fourth session
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　　Bailouts: $7 trillion and rising
　　Mortgage rates plummet
　　Auto stocks surge, as bailout hopes grow
　　Why Microsoft fails online
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　　Oil up as China cuts rates | Gas falls below $1.87
　　Get ready for a market bounce
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　　Hiring horrors: Napping in CEO's office

　　警告：奧巴馬的大規模花銷會帶來股市泡沫。

　　Beware the Obama stimulus bubble

　　Construction stocks have surged since the election on hopes of increased infrastructure spending. But some stocks have run up too much.

　　EMAIL | PRINT | SHARE | RSSBy Paul R. La Monica, CNNMoney.com editor at large

　　Last Updated: November 26, 2008: 12:31 PM ET

　　About the author
　　AMERICA'S MONEY CRISIS
　　Shares of national banks fall
　　JPMorgan profit forecast slashed
　　Bailouts: $7 trillion and rising
　　Dow gains for fourth session
　　A squeeze on Thanksgiving dinner
　　Will a second stimulus work?
　　
　　More VideosQuick Vote
　　Should the Obama administration launch a massive stimulus plan upon taking office?

　　YesNo or View resultsNEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) -- Death and taxes...and overexuberance by investors.

　　Yes, even in this terrible environment for the markets and economy, traders were certain to find a sector to pump up.

　　This time around it's construction, and leading stocks in this sector have surged on the expectation that President-elect Barack Obama will push for more spending on infrastructure as part of an economic stimulus package.

　　In just the past week alone, shares of construction-management firm Fluor Corp (FLR, Fortune 500). have gained 17% and energy-engineering company Shaw Group (SGR, Fortune 500) has skyrocketed 22%

　　Some of these stocks began to run up even before the election in the hopes of an Obama victory. Shares of contractor and construction materials maker Granite Construction (GVA) are up nearly 70% in the past month. Engineering firm URS (URS, Fortune 500) has soared 65%.

　　Investors need to be cautious here.

　　Yes, it's likely that many of these firms would receive some financial lift from increased spending on highways and other projects.

　　Talkback: Will increased spending on infrastructure help the economy?
　　But any new business from a stimulus package might not be enough to offset lost business stemming from a weak economy.

　　"There has been a focus on who will benefit from infrastructure stimulus. While these companies will get work from it, I don't know how significant the benefit will be," said Chase Jacobson, an analyst with Sterne Agee. "I do think that the runup here is a little overdone. Next year for these companies might be okay, but there's a huge question mark around 2010."

　　Jacobson said that while investors are focusing on the potential increase in public-works projects, many construction firms rely more on other areas of the economy, such as the energy sector.

　　Jacobs Engineering (JEC, Fortune 500), for example, is a company he follows that may get some new business as a result of more infrastructure spending. But it would not move the dial on the company's sales or profits all that much, he thinks

　　"To do work on a highway or build a small bridge - that amount is nothing in comparison to building a refinery," he said.

　　Matt Kaufler, co-portfolio manager of the Touchstone Value Opportunities fund, agreed that investors should not rush into infrastructure stocks just because of the hope of increased stimulus spending.

　　Kaufler said his fund owns shares of Shaw Group but not because he expects a short-term stimulus pop. Instead, he's holding the stock for the long-haul because he believes Shaw is the best company to benefit from a global buildout of power-generating infrastructure.

　　So like with any industry, investors should do their homework and not blindly buy a stock just because it's perceived to be in a hot sector. With any group, there will always be losers as well as winners. A big call on an entire sector is a risky move.

　　Anyway, happy Thanksgiving to all. I hope that none of you are going to stuff yourself with aTurgooduccochiqua. Yuck!
　　First Published: November 26, 2008: 12:19 PM ET

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　　Stimulus, take 2: The right way

　　Why Not to Be the Richest Man in China

　　By AUSTIN RAMZY / BEIJING
　　Tuesday, Nov. 25, 2008

　　Wong Kwong Yu poses in a Gome store in Beijing in 2006

　　Chien-Min Chung for TIME

　　PrintEmailShareReprintsRelated
　　There's no better way to say you've arrived in China than to be named on one of the country's rich lists. Of course, such an honor can also be an indicator that you will soon disappear for a long, long time. In recent years the rankings of China's wealthiest have included several prominent tycoons who have later been jailed on fraud and corruption charges.

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　　The latest candidate for such a fall is Wong Kwong Yu, 39, the chairman of mainland electronics retailing giant Gome. Wong, named by the Hurun Report last month as China's richest man with an estimated net worth of $6.3 billion, was detained last week on suspicion of fraud, Chinese media reported. According to a report in the financial magazine Caijing, Wong (his name is also spelled Huang Guangyu) is being investigated for manipulating the share prices of Shanghai-listed Shandong Jintai Group, a medical company controlled by his brother, Wong Chung-yam. (See pictures of what money can buy.)

　　Shares of the Hong Kong-listed Gome Electrical Appliances Holding were suspended Monday, after the company announced that it was unable to verify the reports of Wong's detention. The company announced Gome "is making necessary enquires for the purpose of verifying the allegations." Shandong Jintai shares were also suspended.

　　In 2006, the government launched an investigation into loan fraud charges brough against Wong. A year later, Gome announced that the investigation was completed, and its founder was never charged. His recent troubles make him the latest high-profile tycoon to run afoul of authorities. The ranks of recent years' rich lists read like a police blotter. In 2003 Yang Bin, an agribusiness and real estate tycoon once named the mainland's second-richest man, was convicted of tax evasion and sentenced to 18 years in prison. Gu Chujun, once head of a leading appliance company, was ranked China's 20th richest businessperson byForbes in 2001. In January, he was convicted of falsifying corporate reports and sentenced to a 12-year prison term. And Zhou Zhengyi, a Shanghai-based real estate developer named China's 11th richest person by Forbes in 2002, was arrested the following year on corruption charges. He served three years in prison, and was then sentenced to an additional 16-year term for bribery and fraud. (See pictures of China on the wild side.)

　　The high-profile convictions indicate that China is still struggling to move beyond its unruly early days of privatization. The prosecutions are "a reflection of the cowboy capitalism, the relatively unregulated capitalism that exists in China," says David Zweig, a China scholar at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. "Many capitalist in China made their money either through their relationship with government officials or in somewhat shady deals." For those wealthy few, staying on top can prove more difficult than getting there.

　　You are here: Politics & International Relations / The Empire of Lies
　　

　　hardcover

　　325 pages

　　ISBN: 1-59403-216-5

　　$25.95 List price

　　Buy from Amazon.com:

　　
　　

　　Buy from Barnes and Noble:

　　The Empire of Lies

　　The Truth about China in the Twenty-First Century

　　GUY SORMAN
　　Overview
　　Reviews
　　The Western press these days is full of stories on China’s arrival as a superpower, some even warning that the future may belong to her. Western political and business delegations stream into Beijing, confident inChina’s economy, which continues to grow rapidly. Crowning China’s new status, Beijing will host the 2008 Olympic Games.

　　But as Guy Sorman reveals in Empire of Lies China’s success is, at least in part, a mirage. True, 200 million of her subjects, those fortunate enough to be working in an expanding global market, enjoy a middle-class standard of living. The remaining one billion, however, are among the poorest, most exploited people in the world. Popular discontent simmers, especially in the countryside, where it often flares into violent confrontation with Communist Party authorities. In truth, China’s economic “miracle” is rotting from within.

　　In this extraordinary book, Sorman explains how the West has conferred greater legitimacy on Chinathan do the Chinese themselves. He has visited the country regularly for forty years and spent most of the past three years exploring her teeming cities and remotest corners. Empire of Lies is the culmination of these travels and perhaps the only book on China that lets the Chinese people speak for themselves.

　　
　　Preview this book

　　This past spring, the outbreak of SARS grabbed the attention of the world. The schizophrenic, paranoid way the Chinese government handled the outbreak perfectly illustrated the danger of a political system unaccountable to its citizens.In The New Chinese Empire, Ross Terrill assesses this government, and the central question it raises: Is the People's Republic of China, whose polity is a hybrid of Chinese tradition and Western Marxism, willing to become a modern nation-or does it insist on remaining an empire? Hanging in the balance are the prospect for freedom within China, the future of America's relations with China, and the security of China's neighbors.This enlightening book is a must-read for everyone doing business in China and all who have a stake in the future of the global world order.

　　More details

　　The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means for the United States

　　By Ross Terrill

　　Published by Basic Books, 2004

　　ISBN 0465084133, 9780465084135

　　400 pages

　　

　　Contents

　　How the Chinese Imperial State Was Formed39

　　Xiongnu, China, Kalmyks

　　Red Emperor131

　　Jiang Qing, Jiang Wen, Shen Tong

　　Beijing Juggles the Legacy of Empire179

　　Manchuria, Taiwan, Wang Anshi

　　Maritime Empire205

　　Chen Shuibian, Taiwan independence, Inner Mongolia

　　Steppe Empire229

　　Dalai Lama, Uighur, Chadrel Rinpoche

　　HalfEmpire and HalfModern Nation279

　　Song Dynasty, Li Hongzhang, Xiongnu

　　more ?

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　　Bill and Melinda Gates go back to school

　　Their crusade to fix schools earned a "needs improvement," so they have a new plan. The most surprising beneficiaries? Community colleges.

　　By Claudia Wallis, Spencer Fellow in education journalism

　　NOVEMBER 26, 2008: 5:59 AM ET

　　

　　Melinda and Bill Gates at Hidalgo Early College High School in the Rio Grande Valley in Texas.

　　

　　Bill and Melinda Gates at the Yes Prep at Houston's Lee High School, a model for getting more low-income students ready for college-level work.

　　

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　　Bill and Melinda Gates go back to school

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　　(Fortune Magazine) -- When Bill Gates gets worked up about something, his body language changes. He suspends his habit of rocking forward and back in his chair and sits a little straighter. His voice rises in pitch. Today the subject is America's schools.

　　It's "a paradox," he says in an exclusive interview with Fortune, that "America has been so successful with such terrible education." We've gotten away with it, he says, by pampering an elite 20% - those who attend top colleges and the best public high schools and private academies, as Gates did himself before famously dropping out of Harvard.

　　But now that has to change, he insists. With low-skill jobs vanishing and global competition on the rise, "the imperative is to not just do well for the top 20% but to do well for everyone." How to do it, however, is a question that has taxed his prodigious energy, brainpower, and resources. Now Gates has a new approach that includes a surprising element: community colleges.

　　Since 2000 the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has invested $2 billion in public education, plus another $2 billion in scholarships. Most of it went into efforts to improve high schools that serve poor and minority students - mainly breaking up big, urban high schools and creating smaller, friendlier, and in theory more scholastically sound academies. (All told, the Gates Foundation gave money to 2,602 schools in 40 school districts.) Overall, it hasn't worked.

　　"We had a high hope that just by changing the structure, we'd do something dramatic," Gates concedes. "But it's nowhere near enough."

　　The results were a disappointing setback. So Gates and his $35 billion foundation went back to school on the issue. They spent more than a year analyzing what went wrong (and in some cases what went right). They hired new leaders for their education effort, while Gates turned his attention to philanthropy full-time after stepping away from his operating role at Microsoft last summer.

　　In mid-November, when Gates and his wife, Melinda, were finally ready to unveil their fresh direction, they delivered the news at a private forum at the Sheraton Seattle for America's education elite, including New York City schools chief Joel Klein, his Washington, D.C., counterpart, Michelle Rhee, Education Secretary Margaret Spellings, and top advisors to President-elect Obama.

　　The upshot is that Education 2.0 is bolder and more aggressive in its goals, and it involves even more intensive investment - $3 billion over the next five years. This time the focus isn't on the structure of public high schools but on what's inside the classrooms: the quality of the teaching and the relevance of the curriculum. It steers smack into some of the biggest controversies in American education - tying teacher tenure and salaries to performance, and setting national standards for what is taught and tested.

　　And it looks beyond high school. "Our goal, with your help, is to double the number of low-income students who earn post-secondary degrees or credentials that let them earn a living wage," declared Melinda French Gates at the Seattle gathering.

　　About 70% of U.S. high school graduates now enroll in some kind of higher education, according to federal statistics, but only about half complete a degree, and among poor and minority students, it's more like 20%. Doubling that percentage, which the foundation aims to do by 2025, is essential, Melinda Gates insisted, "if we're going to make any dent in poverty in America."

　　The idea of focusing so much on college readiness is a provocative one among educators. Many, including some at the Seattle summit, think intervening in high school is awfully late in the game. They argue that the Gates Foundation should direct some of its efforts toward early-childhood education or middle school, where the gap in achievement between rich and poor begins to widen alarmingly and where U.S. students start to fall behind their global peers.

　　But America's most successful dropout passionately defends the decision to focus on college. Gates seems personally outraged that so many low-income students are lost in the transition from high school to college and the workplace:

　　"You think you've got a high school degree, you think you're ready to go, and then you get into a system that's totally unclear." It galls him that poorly prepared students wind up paying for remedial courses that cover what they should have learned in high school. "How much money is spent on that and how little comes out of it!"

　　A stunning statistic from the foundation's analysis: More than half the money spent on higher education in the U.S., which includes more than $100 billion a year on student aid, does not lead to any degree or credential.

　　That analysis is what led the Gateses to a new focus on community colleges, which are relatively affordable and widespread, and already educate high proportions of minority students. Hilary Pennington, a co-founder of the Jobs for the Future research group who now heads the Gates post-secondary effort, has an intriguing battery of ideas she hopes to test over the next few years. Among them:

　　From the Publisher

　　In 1999, in The Return of Depression Economics, Paul Krugman surveyed the economic crises that had swept across Asia and Latin America, and pointed out that those crises were a warning for all of us: like diseases that have become resistant to antibiotics, the economic maladies that caused the Great Depression were making a comeback. In the years that followed, as Wall Street boomed and financial wheeler-dealers made vast profits, the international crises of the 1990s faded from memory. But now depression economics has come to America: when the great housing bubble of the mid-2000s burst, the U.S. financial system proved as vulnerable as those of developing countries caught up in earlier crises and a replay of the 1930s seems all too possible.

　　In this greatly updated edition of The Return of Depression Economics, Krugman shows how the failure of regulation to keep pace with an increasingly out-of-control financial system set the United States, and the world as a whole, up for the greatest financial crisis since the 1930s. He also lays out the steps that must be taken to contain the crisis, and turn around a world economy sliding into a deep recession. Brilliantly crafted in Krugman's trademark style. -- lucid, lively, and supremely informed -- this edition will become an instant cornerstone of the debate over how to respond to the crisis.

　　About the Author

　　PAUL KRUGMAN is the recipient of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economics. He writes a twice-weekly Op-Ed column for The New York Times and a blog named for his 2007 book, The Conscience of a Liberal. He teaches economics at Princeton University.

　　OP-ED COLUMNIST

　　Depression Economics Returns

　　COMMENTS(487)

　　By PAUL KRUGMAN
　　Published: November 14, 2008

　　The economic news, in case you haven’t noticed, keeps getting worse. Bad as it is, however, I don’t expect another Great Depression. In fact, we probably won’t see the unemployment rate match its post-Depression peak of 10.7 percent, reached in 1982 (although I wish I was sure about that).

　　

　　Fred R. Conrad/The New York Times

　　Paul Krugman

　　Go to Columnist Page ?Blog: The Conscience of a Liberal
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　　Times Topics: United States Economy
　　Readers' Comments

　　"For the U.S. to reemerge from this funk, we need a redefinition of 'the good life' ... based on 'the common good.'"

　　Tim Cornillie, Barrington, Ill.

　　Read Full Comment ?
　　We are already, however, well into the realm of what I call depression economics. By that I mean a state of affairs like that of the 1930s in which the usual tools of economic policy — above all, the Federal Reserve’s ability to pump up the economy by cutting interest rates — have lost all traction. When depression economics prevails, the usual rules of economic policy no longer apply: virtue becomes vice, caution is risky and prudence is folly.

　　To see what I’m talking about, consider the implications of the latest piece of terrible economic news: Thursday’s report on new claims for unemployment insurance, which have now passed the half-million mark. Bad as this report was, viewed in isolation it might not seem catastrophic. After all, it was in the same ballpark as numbers reached during the 2001 recession and the 1990-1991 recession, both of which ended up being relatively mild by historical standards (although in each case it took a long time before the job market recovered).

　　But on both of these earlier occasions the standard policy response to a weak economy — a cut in the federal funds rate, the interest rate most directly affected by Fed policy — was still available. Today, it isn’t: the effective federal funds rate (as opposed to the official target, which for technical reasons has become meaningless) has averaged less than 0.3 percent in recent days. Basically, there’s nothing left to cut.

　　And with no possibility of further interest rate cuts, there’s nothing to stop the economy’s downward momentum. Rising unemployment will lead to further cuts in consumer spending, which Best Buy warned this week has already suffered a “seismic” decline. Weak consumer spending will lead to cutbacks in business investment plans. And the weakening economy will lead to more job cuts, provoking a further cycle of contraction.

　　To pull us out of this downward spiral, the federal government will have to provide economic stimulus in the form. of higher spending and greater aid to those in distress — and the stimulus plan won’t come soon enough or be strong enough unless politicians and economic officials are able to transcend several conventional prejudices.

　　One of these prejudices is the fear of red ink. In normal times, it’s good to worry about the budget deficit — and fiscal responsibility is a virtue we’ll need to relearn as soon as this crisis is past. When depression economics prevails, however, this virtue becomes a vice. F.D.R.’s premature attempt to balance the budget in 1937 almost destroyed the New Deal.

　　Another prejudice is the belief that policy should move cautiously. In normal times, this makes sense: you shouldn’t make big changes in policy until it’s clear they’re needed. Under current conditions, however, caution is risky, because big changes for the worse are already happening, and any delay in acting raises the chance of a deeper economic disaster. The policy response should be as well-crafted as possible, but time is of the essence.

　　Finally, in normal times modesty and prudence in policy goals are good things. Under current conditions, however, it’s much better to err on the side of doing too much than on the side of doing too little. The risk, if the stimulus plan turns out to be more than needed, is that the economy might overheat, leading to inflation — but the Federal Reserve can always head off that threat by raising interest rates. On the other hand, if the stimulus plan is too small there’s nothing the Fed can do to make up for the shortfall. So when depression economics prevails, prudence is folly.

　　What does all this say about economic policy in the near future? The Obama administration will almost certainly take office in the face of an economy looking even worse than it does now. Indeed, Goldman Sachs predicts that the unemployment rate, currently at 6.5 percent, will reach 8.5 percent by the end of next year.

　　All indications are that the new administration will offer a major stimulus package. My own back-of-the-envelope calculations say that the package should be huge, on the order of $600 billion.

　　So the question becomes, will the Obama people dare to propose something on that scale?

　　Let’s hope that the answer to that question is yes, that the new administration will indeed be that daring. For we’re now in a situation where it would be very dangerous to give in to conventional notions of prudence.

　　A Review of Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics

　　J. Bradford DeLong

　　delong@econ.berkeley.edu 　　http://www.j-bradford-delong.net
　　May 1999

　　Paul Krugman (1999), The Return of Depression Economics (New York: W.W. Norton: 039304839X).

　　

　　This is a book that anyone interested in international economic policy and the possible destinies of the world economy needs to read. Paul Krugman is, as I have said before, the best claimant to the mantle of John Maynard Keynes: an extremely knowledgeable professional economist, an excellent writer, and an incisive critic of what international economic policymakers are doing wrong.

　　But no one should read The Return of Depression Economics thinking that they will learn answers. Krugman does not have any answers. In large part this is because this book was written too quickly--but it had to be written quickly if Krugman is to have influence over debates and policies, rather than just join the rest of us who aspire to clean up after the elephants once the parade has gone through. In part this is because Krugman guesses wrong in a few places: writing in January he forecast that by now the Brazilian economy would be in either hyperdeflation or deep recession.

　　So while the book is great at laying out the basic issues in the management of the global economy, it is already out-of-date as far as the choices facing us are concerned, and--as I said above--I think that it was written too quickly to be able to provide us with the answers that we need. There are parts of the book I love. There are parts of the book I question. And then there are parts of the book I hate.

　　

　　Japanese stagnation

　　The core of Krugman's book is made up of analyses of the two greatest economic disasters of the 1990s: the lost decade of economic growth in Japan, and the waves of currency crises and depression that have rolled around the world from Britain and Sweden in 1992 to Mexico and Argentina in 1995 to East Asia's rim in 1997 to Brazil in 1998-1999. These are the parts of the book I love.

　　Krugman's analysis of how the Japanese economy entered its present period of stagnation is lucid, clear, and accurate. The collapse of the financial bubble of the 1980s depressed consumption and investment spending. Banks' and other institutions' large bets on the real estate market meant that the collapse of the bubble put them "underwater"--with assets and lines of business that were worth less than the debt they already owed that they had borrowed to speculate in real estate. Who will invest in a business--or a bank--if you fear that your money will be used not to boost profitability but instead to pay back creditors who had loaned to the business before you?

　　The answer to what you should do in order to recover from such a state of depressed aggregate demand is "everything." You should have the government run a substantial deficit (although, as E. Cary Brown of MIT pointed out in the 1950s, it requires truly awesome deficit spending--on the order of deficit spending in World War II--to reverse a Great Depression like the U.S. in the 1930s or a Great Stagnation like Japan today). You should have the central bank push the interest rate it charges close to zero (to make it very easy and cheap to borrow money). And if that isn't enough you should--as Krugman advocates--try to deliberately engineer moderate inflation. If demand is depressed because people think investing in corporations is too risky, change their minds by making the alternative to investment spending--hoarding your money in cash--risky too by having a share of its real puchasing power eaten away every year by inflation.

　　So far Japan has changed its fiscal policy to run big deficits (but, as any student of the Great Depression would suspect, they haven't been big enough). Japan has lowered its short-term safe nominal interest rates to within kissing distance of zero. But these haven't done enough good. And so Krugman thinks it is time for the deliberate engineering of inflation to extract Japan from what economists call its "liquidity trap."

　　But at this point Krugman doesn't have all the answers. For while the fact of regular, moderate inflation would certainly boost aggregate demand for products made in Japan, the expectation of inflation would cause an adverse shift in aggregate supply: firms and workers would demand higher prices and wages in anticipation of the inflation they expected would occur, and this increase in costs would diminish how much real production and employment would be generated by any particular level of aggregate demand.

　　Would the benefits on the demand side from the fact of regular moderate inflation outweigh the costs on the supply side of a general expectation that Japan is about to resort to deliberate inflationary finance? Probably. I'm with Krugman on this one. But it is just a guess--it is not my field of expertise--I would want to spend a year examining the macroeconomic structure of the Japanese economy in detail before I would be willing to claim even that my guess was an informed guess.

　　And there is another problem. Suppose that investors do not see the fact of inflation--suppose that Japan does not adopt inflationary finance--but that a drumbeat of advocates claiming that inflation is necessary causes firms and workers to mark up prices and wages. Then we have the supply-side costs but not the demand-side benefits, and so we are worse off than before. Something like this happened to the Popular Front government of Leon Blum in France in the late 1930s.

　　Thus senior officials of the U.S. government have a problem. Since at least the replacement of the Bush by the Clinton administration, the accepted doctrine inside the U.S. government is that Japanese economic policy ought--for Japan's own sake, and for the rest of our's--to be "more Keynesian." Quiet whispers of advice to Japanese policymakers may, but probably will not, have much influence on what policy actually is. Loud shouts through public megaphones do have a greater chance of influencing actual policy, but also run the risk of triggering adverse shifts in aggregate supply.

　　Part of the arcana imperii--the secret knowledge of government--of economics is that "Keynesian" policies (like those advocated by Krugman) are most successful when they are enthusiastically adopted by were not generally anticipated, much less effective when they are both adopted but also anticipated, and positively destructive when they are anticipated but not actually adopted and implemented. In my view, at least, these considerations make it a much harder problem than Krugman suggests to discern the best course of action for Japanese economic policymakers, and for government officials outside of Japan who wish the Japanese people well.

　　

　　Currency crises

　　But the center of the core of Krugman's book is his analysis of the wave of financial currency crises that have hit the world in the 1990s. The collapse of the European Monetary System in 1992, the collapse of the Mexican peso (that then spread to other Latin American currencies) in 1994-5, and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, the Brazilian crises of 1998-9. One international financial crisis every two years is a lot.

　　In all these cases the root of the crisis is a sudden change of heart on the part of investors in the world economy's industrial core--in New York, Frankfurt, London, and Tokyo. In Mexico in 1993 international investors poured some $25 billion into the economy; in Mexico in 1995--even theough the peso had been devalued by two-thirds, every piece of property and every business in Mexico was thus three times cheaper, and the country was the same country--international investors took perhaps $10 billion out of the country. In East Asia in 1996 international investors poured perhaps $70 billion into the region's economies. In 1998 the net private capital flow was about -$40 billion.

　　The root causes of all of these crises lie in sudden changes in international investors' opinions. Like a herd of not-very-smart cattle, they all were going one way and investing in the particular "emerging market" at the center of the crisis in 1993 or 1996, and then they turned around and were all going the opposite way and pulling their capital out of the "emerging market" even if they had to sell it at fire-sale prices two years later.

　　Economists will long dispute which was less rational: Was the stampede of capital into emerging markets an irrational mania disconnected from fundamentals of profit and business, or was the stampede of captal out of emerging markets an irrational panic? The correct answer is probably "yes"--the market was manic, and was panicked, and the sudden change in opinion reflected not a cool judgment of changing fundamentals but instead a sudden psychological victory of fear over greed.

　　So if sudden changes of opinion by international investors cause so much trouble, shouldn't we keep such sudden changes of opinion from having destructive effects? Shouldn't we use capital controls and other devices to keep international flows of investment small, manageable, and firmly corralled? Shouldn't we--as Mahathir Muhammed has done and as Paul Krugman advocates--impose capital controls?

　　The first generation of post-World War II economists would have said "yes." The second and third generations regretted that capital controls kept people with money to lend in the industrial core away from people who could make good use of the money to expand economic growth. The balance of opinion shifted to the view that too much was sacrificed in economic growth at the periphery for whatever reduction in instability capital controls produced--especially since the regime of capital controls was one in which the cousin of the wife of the vice-minister of finance somehow received permission to import capital, and thus capital controls paved the way to kleptocracy: rule by the thieves.

　　So today we have the benefits of free international flows of capital. The ability to borrow from abroad gives successful emerging market economies the power to cut a decade or two off of the time it takes for them to industrialize. But this free flow of financial capital is also giving us one major international financial crisis every two years.

　　So what is to be done when such a crisis hits--if we are going to try to do better than to abandon the ability of the third world to draw on the first world's financial reserves to finance industrialization?

　　Perhaps the best way for policymakers in an emerging market to think of a sudden panic by investors in the industrial core is that it is a sudden fall in demand for your country's products. Before the panic, you had lots of exports on what economists call the capital account of the balance of payments: you sold to investors in the industrial core factories in your country, businesses located in your country, and bonds issued by your businesses and your governments. But now, after the panic, this demand has dried up.

　　What does a business firm do when all of a sudden demand for the products it makes falls? The firm cuts its price. A country faced with a sudden fall in demand for the products it makes should do the same: it should cut its price. The easiest way for a country to cut its price is by allowing its exchange rate to depreciate--to let the price of the peso fall from 4 to the dollar to 8 to the dollar is roughly the same as a business firm responding to a fall in demand by offering 50% off.

　　But there are situations in which the natural thing, the obvious thing, the "Keynesian compact" thing (as Paul Krugman calls it) runs into problems. Suppose that your banks, businesses, and governments have borrowed massively abroad and have done so not by promising to pay back their creditors in pesos but by promising to pay back their creditors in dollars (or yen, or euros, or pounds). Then a depreciation of the exchange rate bankrupts the economy: the dollar value of all the banks' and businesses' assets are halved by the depreciation while the dollar value of their liabilities is unchanged. Such an interlinked chain of general bankruptcies destroys the economy's ability to transform. household savings into investment expenditures, and is the stuff of which Great Depressions are made.

　　Just as bad, in many emerging economies belief that inflation will remain low is closely tied to the stability of the exchange rate. A large depreciation of the exchange rate runs the risk of setting off a large adverse shift in aggregate supply as expectations of inflation become general--and of causing the economic chaos that follows from way-out-of-control inflation.

　　But not depreciating the exchange rate is no solution either. In order to keep massive capital flight--both because of core investors' panic, and because those who haven't panicked expect depreciation because it is the natural thing to do--from occurring, interest rates would have to be driven to sky-high levels. And such sky-high interest rates choke off investment, trigger chains of bankruptcies, and lead to Great Depression as well.

　　So is there a possible path to safety? Can you raise interest rates enough to keep the depreciation from triggering bankruptcy and hyperinflation, while still avoiding a high interest rate-generated recession? Can you depreciate the exchange rate far enough to restore demand for home-produced goods without depreciating it so far as to bankrupt local businesses and banks? Maybe.

　　The dilemmas are real. The IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and national governments affected try to solve them. Paul Krugman does a very good job of laying out just why it is that the "Keynesian compact" can no longer be kept. I agree with Krugman that economic policy malpractice is being performed by those who (like Jeffrey Sachs) claim that it is obvious that in a financial crisis interest rates should not be raised and the exchange rate allowed to find its own panicked-market level and those who (like Robert Bartley) claim that in a financial crisis interest rates should be raised high enough to keep the exchange rate from falling at all. It's not that simple.

　　

　　Understanding the IMF view

　　But--and here we come to the parts of the book that I question, and that I think were written too quickly--I am not sure that it is right to categorize the IMF and U.S. Treasury view as that "...sound economic policy is not sufficient to gain market confidence," that the economic textbooks need to go "right out the window as soon as the crisis hit[s]," and to conclude that this IMF and U.S. Treasury view "sounds pretty crazy, and it is" (pp. 113-4). And I think it is definitely wrong to conclude that there were "no good choices... no way out... nobody's fault that things turned out so badly" (pp. 117).

　　The reasons that the IMF and U.S. Treasury view is not "pretty crazy" are twofold. First, as noted above, the path that avoids either the disaster of high interest rates or the disaster of general bankruptcy is narrow (if it is there at all): countries that have large amounts of hard currency-denominated debt or have inflation expectations keyed to the exchange rate cannot implement the textbook policies of the Keynesian compact without disaster. Second, the IMF's primary goal is not to provide money so countries can adopt the policies that make them better off. The IMF loans countries money in order to give them more options for policy, yes. But the IMF's first imperative is to make sure that it gets its money back--for if the IMF doesn't get its money back, then the IMF will be unable to lend to the countries affected by the next financial crisis, for the IMF will have vanished as an institution.

　　You may wish that the IMF had different goals. If it were a true world central bank, it wouldn't have to worry much about getting paid back. It could tune its policies to do the most good worldwide. But it isn't a world central bank (although I wish that it were). And I think that Krugman misreads the IMF's motives and objectives and fails to recognize that much IMF "conditionality" is imposed not because it is good for the borrowing country as because it is good for the institutional survival of the IMF (and thus, presumably, for the other countries that will borrow from the IMF in the future).

　　Thus I think Paul Krugman misses the first and biggest thing that could be done to make the world economy better. Refund the IMF. Boost its resources tenfold, so that it no longer has to worry so much about having one single large borrower fail to repay. Then the IMF could act more like a world central bank, and adopt policies aimed at minimizing unemployment and recession rather than policies aimed at maximizing the short-term export surpluses of borrowers.

　　But Krugman certainly gets the second and third positive things that can be done right. Strongly discourage--tax--borrowers in the periphery from borrowing in the hard currencies of the industrial core. If you are going to accept free international capital flows (in an attempt to use foreign financing for your industrial revolution) then be sure that your exchange rate can float without causing trouble for the domestic economy. If your exchange rate must stay fixed (for inflation-fighting or other reasons), then recognize that an important part of keeping it fixed are controls over capital movements.

　　We don't have to have a global economy as vulnerable to currency crises as the economy of the 1990s has been.

　　

　　Being pedantic

　　And then there are the aspects of the book that I absolutely hate. I am a pedant. And the book lacks references and footnotes.

　　The book jacket flap refers to the "Federal Reserve Board's bailout here in the United States of the over-leveraged Long-Term Capital Management Corporation." You--reading this--think that it probably means that the Federal Reserve loaned LTCM a very large sum at low interest rates, or foregave a substantial debt that the LTCM owed it. Not so: what happened is that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York gathered LTCM's major creditors and LTCM's principals together in a room, and said to them "you have a big problem; fix it." Now surely the Federal Reserve brought something to the table besides supplying the coffee for the meeting: those creditors who were thinking about demanding all their money up front now surely thought that the Federal Reserve was taking names, and that being uncooperative was to expose oneself to certain risks should one ever need something from the Federal Reserve (and, conversely, that being cooperative meant that one's case in the future would be listened to more sympathetically than otherwise).

　　Now this is not laissez-faire. This is the government putting its thumb on the scales of the market. But to call it a "Federal Reserve...bailout" is to miss flatten the landscape, and suppress important distinctions and nuances about how government intervention in financial markets actually works in practice.

　　Or consider page 56, about the Mexican peso support package of 1995, where Krugman writes that "... the U.S. congress would not approve any funding for a Mexican rescue... it turned out that the U.S. Treasury can at its own discretion make use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund.... The intent of the legislation that established that fund was clearly to stabilize the value of the dollar; but... with admirable creativity Treaury used it to stabilize the peso instead." This story leaves out the letter from the Speaker of the House (Gingrich) the Minority Leader of the House (Gephardt), the Majority Leader of the Senate (Dole), and the Minority Leader of the Senate (Daschle) all urging--begging--the Treasury to perform. this creative use of the ESF so that they could go back to the members of congress--of both parties--and receive their applause for having enabled the members to duck a difficult vote.

　　Thus it is not quite correct to say that the U.S. congress would not approve any funding. The U.S. congress was eager for the Treasury to assume responsibility but also would rather have seen the Treasury act than not. Once again important distinctions and nuances--in this case that much of the time the overriding goal of congress is to hide, and make sure that making substantive decisions is somebody else's responsibility. A nuance, you say? Yes, but in my view an important one.

　　All authors face this problem: to tell the whole story about anything is impossible, and to tell less than the whole story is inevitably to distort--somehow. In my view Krugman has done as good a job as anyone could: I can't improve on him without taking more space for explanations.

　　But this is what footnotes are for: footnotes are supposed to signal readers where stories have been (necessarily) simplified in order to fit on the page, and direct curious readers to places where they can find the stories told at greater length, with more attention to details and nuances.

　　But this book has no footnotes, no references. When Krugman writes of the "... strand of thought that says that moderate inflation may be necessary if monetary policy is to be able to fight inflation... one notable exponent of this view, in his pre-government days, was Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers," I know that Krugman is referring to J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers (1993), "Macroeconomic Policy and Long-Run Growth," in Policies for Long-Run Economic Growth (Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City: ), pp. 93-128. But I (and Larry) may well be the only people who will know what Paul means. And we know it only because we wrote it, for we are the authors of the piece to which Paul's footnote, if it existed, would point.

　　Now I understand that editors at Norton fear footnotes, and think that they greatly reduce the audience for the book. But at least put them up on the web!

　　

　　Conclusion

　　Paul Krugman is always worth reading. He is usually right, and when he is wrong he makes you think hard about why.

　　This book is one in which he is wronger than he usually is: 75% right on my estimation, as opposed to his usual score of 90% right. (That is, 90% agreement with Brad DeLong.) The main reason for his lower score is that he wrote this book in medias res in the hope of having an impact--thus he forecasts economic disaster for Brazil by mid-1999, and we can look around and see that (at least as of this moment), Brazil appears to be weathering its crisis. But a second reason for his lower score is that he does not seem to have fully absorbed the lessons of the 1970s: that the Keynesian compact does not always work, and that worrying about aggregate demand alone leaves you vulnerable to disturbances to aggregate supply. And a third reason is the speed with which the book was written: I wonder whether on reflection Krugman might blame defects of IMF policy more on its institutional situation and less on muddled thinking by Michel Camdessus and Stanley Fischer.

　　But, fourth, the issues are very hard ones. I know that my own views are evolving fairly rapidly. I doubt that if I had written a book on this last year that I could attain 75% correctness--understood as 75% agreement with my self today.

　　(图文)他后年任Fed主席 要再次拯救世界经济

　　
　　美国前财长桑莫斯可能在2010年后替换柏南克，出任联邦准备理事会（Fed）主席。


　　美国民主党消息人士说，美国候任总统欧巴马预定24日宣布任命前财政部长桑莫斯，担任白宫全国经济委员会主席，并预定在2010年替换柏南克，出任联邦准备理事会（Fed）主席。欧巴马也决定任命现任纽约联邦准备银行总裁盖特纳担任财政部长。

　　投资人对欧巴马的任命投下信任票，激励美国股市21日从11年来的最低点强劲反弹，曜计斩?00种股价指数大涨6.3%，以800.03点收盘。

　　桑莫斯现任哈佛大学教授，先前担任哈佛大学校长期间，因为发表具有性别歧视嫌疑的言论，被迫辞职。他也是克林顿政府最后一任财政部长，出任财政部长前，担任财政部次长，主管国际经济事务，在1997年亚洲金融危机与墨西哥倒债危机爆发时，参与处理危机，危机管理经验丰富。

　　桑莫斯在欧巴马竞选美国总统时，担任欧巴马的顾问，上周初，桑莫斯还发表言论，敦促美国政府推动足以在今后两、三年内刺激经济的大规模财政方案。

　　出任白宫全国经济顾问委员会主席后，桑莫斯必然会全力参与欧巴马政府解决信用危机、振兴美国经济的决策，评断当前财政部推动的众多纾困方案。设法引导美国经济走上比较繁荣的道路，整顿美国的金融管理机制，确保类似的金融危机不再发生。

　　桑莫斯是经济奇才，28岁就创下就创下哈佛大学有史以来最年轻就获取终身教授资格的纪录，出任美国财政部次长前，自1991年起，担任世界银行首席经济学家，熟悉国际经济事务，主张经济国际主义。

　　个性强硬、说话直率的桑莫斯即将出任白宫全国经济委员会主席，得到第二次拯救世界经济的机会，这次他必须动用所有脑力、使出浑身解数，才能不负过去英名。

　　1999年初，时代杂志讨论亚洲金融危机的封面故事中，把当时担任财政部次长的桑莫斯、财政部长鲁宾和联邦准备理事会主席葛林史班，称为「拯救世界委员会」，盛赞他们领导包含盖特纳在内的小组，平息了横扫新兴市场国家的外汇与金融危机。

　　年后，53岁的桑莫斯又将担当重任，负起集成美国经济政策、拟定振兴美国经济计画的责任，只是这次的任务更为艰钜，因为全球经济都在沈沦，全球金融危机比起亚洲金融危机更为可怕，危急形势直逼1930年代的世界经济大萧条。

　　桑莫斯最近大声疾呼：美国必须采取「快速、规模庞大、可以永续的」长期刺激经济措施，才能挽救美国经济于危亡。现在他可以亲自推动自己的构想了。

　　桑莫斯才华横溢，锋芒外露，经常直言不讳，引发风波。偶尔还名士风流，不拘形容，肩膀上扛着点点头皮屑。不过在经济方面，他可是家学渊源，父母都是经济学博士，有两位叔叔得过诺贝尔经济学奖，自己28岁时，就创下哈佛大学有史以来最年轻就获取终身教授资格的纪录。

　　他在1999年7月鲁宾辞去财长后，出任克林顿政府的财政部长；2001年布什政府上任后，他出任哈佛大学校长，却因为说出女性因为天性关系，踏进科学与工程领域的人数比男性少，引起激烈争议，被迫辞职。

　　这番打击没有打倒桑莫斯，他继续在哈佛教书，同时继续在公共领域活跃。欧巴马争逐白宫大位时，桑莫斯也在一旁献策，协助欧巴马在雷曼兄弟公司倒闭事件中，作出优异反应，吸引众多选民。

　　桑莫斯作风强悍、信心

　　足，是杰出的经济理论家，却也

　　分了解政治与市场实务。但他主张「经济国际主义」，认定全球化为美国劳工带来好处，却可能触怒抱怨全球化使美国丧失就业机会的民主党国会议员。

　　他的强悍、直率、才华应该可以镇住众多国会议员，同意他推动他参与拟定的拯救经济计画，同时他不怕引发争议，勇于接受挑战的个性，也正是他引导美国经济撤销所需要的重要因素。

　　据韩国《朝鲜日报》26日报道，李明博24日在美国洛杉矶举行的同胞座谈会上表示：“现在不应该抛售股票，应该购买股票。我认为，如果现在购买股票，至少会在一年内成为富翁。” 他举例说：“过去发生金融危机时，我在华盛顿待了一段时间，看到很多人到韩国购买股票和房地产，然后成为大富翁。”上月底举行媒体和经济部长午餐座谈会时，总统也曾表示：“很明显，现在是购买股票的时候。”

　　《朝鲜日报》在社论中表示，李明博对是否应该购买股票指手画脚有失妥当，甚至很危险。即使是华尔街的股神，也不可能正确预测股价。被誉为“奥马哈贤人”的投资天才沃伦-巴菲特10月中旬宣布：“现在应该购买美国股票。”他如自己所言，分别向高盛和通用电气公司（GE）投资50亿美元和20亿美元。但后来，高盛和通用电气的股价分别下跌了50%和40%.这种事例不胜枚举。可以说，被称作“资本主义之花“的股市活力和生命力正是来自于这种不确定性。

　　社论称，李明博去年年底竞选总统时曾表示：“如果实现政权更替，股指明年会突破3000，任期内可能会达到5000。”而目前的股指还不到1000。因此，必须正确认识到李明博的股票言论会如何在市场上流传，以及如何使政府权威和信任度下降。总统应克制对股价、利率、汇率等敏感问题发表言论，这才是明智的选择。

　　 今年10月17日，一向低调的巴菲特在《纽约时报》上撰文称，虽然美国经济处于“糟糕”的状态，但他正在购买美国股票。今年9月，著名投资银行雷曼等纷纷破产之时，巴菲特宣布购入高盛50亿美元的永久性优先股，其普通股可转换价为115美元，此时高盛股价在125美元以上。10月1日，巴菲特又宣布将向陷入困境的通用电气注资30亿美元，承诺以每股22.25美元的价格购入后者的普通股，当时通用电气股价24.50美元。巴菲特除了给市场注入资金，还增强了市场信心。

　　但金融危机太猛烈了。美国股市没有给足巴菲特面子，随后继续下跌，截至上周末，高盛股价较巴菲特入股时暴跌了一半，通用电气股价也一路下跌。与此同时，巴菲特的伯克希尔公司原有的一些重仓股股价也大跌。巴菲特今年流年不利。他至少花了280亿美元进行各类收购和证券投资，亏损被套居多。上周末，巴菲特旗下的伯克希尔公司的股票已经跌至8万美元/股，与去年12月相比已经跌去将近一半；代表市场对公司信用风险态度的伯克希尔CDS(信用违约掉期)保费变成了BBB级，距垃圾债券只有一步之遥。据此，有人认为巴菲特抄底抄早了，抄在了半山腰。

　　抄底是爱国行为？

　　网上这个观点有点标新立异，认为：巴菲特的抄底已经超越了单纯的投资意义，美国政府是利用他的“抄底”提振全国的信心，希望让美国股民看到巴菲特都出手了，危机就应该过去。他这也算是爱国之举。

　　重要的是，市场人士认为应该专业理解巴菲特被套。因为巴菲特购买通用电气、高盛的股票并非普通股，而是具有10%年股息率的永续优先股。优先股既具有普通股的某些性质，也具有债券的性质。巴菲特可以无限期选择持有，每年获取10%年股息率，当两家公司股价高于换股价时，也可以换股，可进可退，高明得很。只要通用电气、高盛不破产，巴菲特的投资就很安全。把两家公司目前普通股股价用来衡量巴菲特投资成败，非常外行。至于巴菲特投资的富国银行、美国运通都是长期持股，他不考虑短期波动。

　　巴菲特抄底的启示

　　如此说来，国人为巴菲特抄底被套而担忧，不必了。对我们来说，分析巴菲特在股市暴跌的情况下为何敢于出手，更加实际和更有意义。

　　联合证券首席分析师程峰对巴菲特的投资理念有研究，也很推崇。他说，巴菲特奉行价值投资，一直以来都不在乎股价的短期波动。金融危机愈演愈烈之际，巴菲特说，我不知道美国或者中国明天发生什么，但我确切知道，有些股票进入值得买入的区间。这就够了。比如他之前投资的可口可乐，从13美元开始买入，但可口可乐的股价一直跌到最低的7美元，巴菲特越跌越买，成为大股东，现在大家都知道这只股票让他获利巨大。程峰还说，巴菲特还说过“买股票吧，现金是垃圾”。意思是，随着各国央行对金融市场不断注资，加上利息不断降低，在流动性紧缩的目前看，好像是水注入沙堆，但迟早有一天会流出来。随着货币的不断增多，满世界都是水，通胀以及货币贬值将不可避免，在这样的情况下，巴菲特认为持有现金不如买进有价值的股票。

　　有些投资者说，我们没有巴菲特那么多钱，也没有他那么有耐心，怎么办？程峰说，那就没有办法。如果没有耐心，就不能做价值投资者，没有耐心，做投机者也不够资格。还有些投资者说，现在股市不稳定，等走势明朗后再进入。程峰认为，趋势不太明朗之时敢于抄底，投资收益最大，等看清楚了再进去，利润空间就小多了。投资不可能没有风险，持有现金也有风险，货币贬值就是风险。

　　关键是持有什么股票。程峰认为买进关乎国计民生的蓝筹股，买进股息率高于一年期存款的大公司股票，买进股价低于重置成本的公司股票，只要你是闲钱投资，经得起市场短期波动，那么这些股票一定会带给你良好回报。现在A股有很多这样的股票。价值投资，不管短期波动，巴菲特过去是这么干的，金融危机下还是这样干。这就是巴菲特抄底给我们的启示。

　　记者直击中国辽宁省沈阳市精神卫生中心炒股失利患者

　　"去年'5·30'以来，我们几乎天天可以接到股民咨询的电话，有些股民焦虑、失眠，患上抑郁症，严重的还出现应激障碍，诱发精神分裂症。"沈阳市精神卫生中心心理咨询中心主任刘长辉说。

　　昨天，记者来到精神卫生中心，对炒股失利患者进行专访。在此，我们老话重提：健康是人生的第一财富。

　　症状一、不愿说话 爱生闷气

　　"这次旅游赔了好几万"

　　股民刘女士今年51岁，8月份去外地旅游，痛快玩了几天，回沈后发现手里的股票连续掉了三个跌停板，30多万元资金从年初就开始不断缩水，最后还剩不到10万元。她后悔得直拍大腿："要是旅游前卖掉就好了，这次旅游赔了好几万，代价太昂贵了！"在悔恨和自责中，刘女士坐卧不安，对生活一下子失去了兴趣，连以前经常参加的秧歌舞也不跳了，和家人不愿意说话，一个人生闷气。

　　刘长辉点评：这位患者的症状属于抑郁症，投资预期与客观现实严重偏离，使患者构筑的幻想状态崩溃，一时无法面对。股票下跌属于诱发因素，直接原因是性格中过于追求完美的特点。患者过于追求完美，会因为一次投资失误而自我贬低，一点过错就掩盖所有优点，认为自己一辈子都完了。

　　症状二、焦虑障碍 怕见熟人

　　"不爱唠这些烦心事"

　　王女士今年54岁，治疗了一个多月，即将出院。见到记者，王女士头句话就说："你们是生人还好，要是熟人，我都不会和他们见面，更别说唠这些烦心事了。"

　　王女士1992年就开始炒股，最初靠投资沈阳本地企业原始股，赚了4万多元。后来开酒店、开商店，积累了近200万元财富。手头宽裕了，在生活消费上就开始大手大脚，1997年花10多万元买了辆轿车。后来孩子出国留学，六七年花光了家里100多万元，渐渐把家底掏空。王女士的生意也不那么景气，股市中赚到了钱又几乎全部吐了回去，现在每月只靠千元左右工资维持花销，这让她十分窝火。

　　刘长辉点评：患者属于焦虑障碍，股市大涨没赚到什么钱，大跌时又回到原点。心理上特别焦虑，无缘由地提心吊胆，焦躁不安，严重的还会出现头晕、恶心、胸闷等症状。

　　症状三、创伤闪回 满脑"石油"

　　"现在我特别恨自己"

　　市民李先生43元买了2000股中石油，结果一路下跌，令他亏损惨重，如今本金只有2万多元。中石油给他的创伤一次次在脑海里"闪回"，大白天满脑子都是中石油股票，看到大盘发绿，马上就惊恐万分，情绪极易激动，一点小事就和家人发火。

　　"现在我特别恨自己，为什么不早卖掉那些赚钱的股票。好日子过惯了，很难再适应艰难的日子。钱是第一位，没了钱啥也不是。现在我年龄也大了，再创业也没机会了。最怕就是熟人问我'孩子在国外怎么样？''手里股票赚了吗？'我现在都躲着熟人走，实在是没面子。"

　　刘长辉点评：个股下跌凶猛，给投资者造成重大精神刺激，这使患者产生应激障碍，需要使他好好倾诉发泄，然后辅助药物治疗。

　　专家开出五大药方

　　刘长辉给股民开出五大药方：

　　■第一，股市是高风险市场，有内在运行规律，股民不要太自我。

　　■第二，股民要认识自己的风险承受能力，在可以承担的范围内投资，分配好投资比例。

　　■第三，股市有兴衰更替，要勇于接受市场变化，按趋势操作，而不是对抗市场，逆势操作。

　　■第四，股票不是人生的全部，要培养自己丰富的兴趣爱好，提高生活质量。

　　■第五，炒股遇到心理问题，需要求助专业医疗机构，加以疏导和治疗，不要闷在肚子里，做傻事。

　　The rage among pundits, journalists and policymakers these days is to believe more government is better than less. And why not? In this time of economic chaos, finance ministers and central bankers around the world have appeared the only bulwark against complete financial collapse, a slide-rule cavalry, armed with billions as bullets, rescuing banks, insurance companies and other corporate damsels in distress.

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　　This whole mess began in the first place, we're told, because of too little government. Those crafty capitalists on Wall Street should have had a heavier dose of regulation to keep them in line. Even the whole concept of free, liberal economies has come under attack. Some observers have gone so far as to praise state-guided economies, like China or the Gulf emirates, where the government owns or controls large swaths of the economy, as superior to their laissez faire counterparts. Columnist Joshua Kurlantzick wrote that these countries "have proven so successful that even before the crisis they caused world leaders to wonder if democratic capitalism might not be the best economic model after all." Americans, some contend, are only now waking up to the inherent dangers of the free market. As one Chinese blogger recently wrote: "The U.S. has realized the mistakes they made, and is learning from China's socialist experience in earnest." (See pictures of the global financial crisis.)

　　There is no doubt that government intervention is an absolute necessity when markets go horribly awry. After Japan's stock-and-real estate bubble burst in the early 1990s, the economy staggered along for half a decade until the government finally stepped in to restructure the financial sector. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, state action was crucial to rebuilding moribund banks and companies.

　　But the current love-in with the state will be short-lived. Every time there has been a perceived crisis of capitalism in recent decades, the government's economic role has swelled. But inevitably, this process has gotten thrown into reverse and the free market stages a rousing comeback. That's because governments can screw up economies just as effectively — in fact, more effectively — than free markets.

　　In Europe after World War II, for example, unfettered capitalism was practically a dirty word. One historian said those who believed in free enterprise were "a defeated party." With memories of the massive unemployment of the Great Depression still fresh, and the need to rebuild from the devastating war all-important, Europe moved towards the state-heavy "mixed" economic model. In the U.K., government leaders nationalized key industries and introduced national health care and other "welfare state" programs. The "mixed" economy performed well for a while, but by the 1970s, it had run into a wall. State-owned firms drained the national budget while inflation soared. In came Margaret Thatcher, who launched a wide-scale privatization of the British economy. The market was back. "It was becoming obvious to people," Thatcher once said, "that the socialist way meant accepting decline."

　　Similarly, many new leaders of the developing nations that emerged from colonial empires in the mid-20th century believed their poverty was rooted in free markets, and leaned toward state control. In India, for example, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister, saw imperialism as an outgrowth of free capitalism; only the state, he figured, could be entrusted to improve the livelihoods of the poor. The result was the bizarre License Raj, a bewildering maze of regulation that hamstrung private enterprise. By 1990, the system had produced outdated, uncompetitive companies and a near-bankrupt government. India only started to boom once intrusive state regulation was scrubbed away, in a bold reform. effort led by Manmohan Singh (the current prime minister) beginning in 1991. "I've come to the conclusion that equity does not mean filing of more regulation of private enterprise," Singh once explained. "Those who create wealth must be given all possible encouragement." (See pictures of the recession of 1958.)

　　Then in the 1980s, as corporate America struggled to compete with a rising Japan, a chorus arose from some economists and business leaders that the U.S. had to ditch its free-market ways for Asia's "state-led" capitalist system. What America needed was to copy aspects of the bureaucracy-managed economy — like its policy of providing state support to favored industries — that seemed such a stunning success in Japan. The American government "can no longer afford not to give more positive guidance" to the economy, wrote Asia expert Ezra Vogel in his 1979 book Japan as Number One, "if our country is to continue to provide world leadership and an optimal quality of life for its own citizens." This view evaporated as well, once Japan's economy stumbled in the 1990s. It became clear that government had contributed to the country's problems by messing around with market forces. "The debate that's been settled is the one over the superiority of the Japanese model of bureaucratic-led economic growth" wrote a columnist in The Wall Street Journal. "The bureaucrats lost."

　　The current shift towards a more powerful state in the U.S. will never go as far as India's License Raj. But there is no reason to believe that this current crisis of capitalism won't end up the same way as all of the others — with a renewal of confidence in the free market. Henry Paulson and some other officials in the Administration and Congress are right to at least be wary of further extensions of the state in the economy, such as the proposed bailouts of the Big Three. Regulation and state control may seem attractive at a time of crisis, but eventually it creates problems of its own, and people will crave the economic freedom they had surrendered. Eventually, even nationalistic Chinese bloggers will figure that out.

　　—With reporting by Lin Yang / Beijing

　　

　　BBC中文网引述彭定康说：“我认为中国是在这样的国际体系下表现得叫人惊讶的一个例子，但它也同时在挑战这体系的根基。”他指出：“而这样的挑战得到那些远没有那么成功的专制体系的欢迎，比方说，非洲的那些独裁政体。”彭定康同时认为，中国“专制、非自由、重商主义”的模式很难突围而出，因为它缺乏了民主制度内在的、用于困难时期的“安全阀”。无独有偶，中共机关报人民日报社主办的《环球时报》，本月初却编译新加坡《海峡时报》一篇关于彭定康的报道，标题是“新报：彭定康认为视中国为威胁只会适得其反”。 报道引述彭定康在北京对英国媒体说，期待中国马上变成一个自由、多元化的民主国家纯属“幼稚”。彭定康“一个中国，两种表述”的现象看似矛盾，却反映了他所代表的西方舆论对于中国崛起的焦虑和不安。

　　新加坡国立大学李光耀公共政策学院院长马凯硕，对于这种焦虑不安提出有趣的见解。他在一篇题为《衰落的西方需要“叫醒电话”》的文章中表示，西方长久以来保持竞争力的各项纪录，已经被越来越多的无能纪录所取代，这包括地缘政治、政治、经济和金融。一个受伤的西方文明因而对中国的崛起深感困扰。马凯硕说：“人权是唯一一个让西方感到自己仍领先于世界的领域，只要西方感到它需要展示自己这种持续的优越性，它就会打出这张人权王牌。”

　　彭定康的新版“中国威胁论”，似乎印证了马凯硕的分析；彭定康关于中国的观点，更多是反映了深层的焦虑，而不是对于中国现状的客观描述。外界一再惊叹崛起的中国，其实也无法免于金融海啸的冲击，官方的发言和举动一再说明，当局对于海啸的经济影响高度重视，而经济发展减速的社会及政治后果更是让中共如履薄冰。北京重拳出击的4万亿人民币刺激内需专案，被《经济学家》形容为全球历史上和平时期最大的政府支出，目的就是在防止已经开始发生的企业倒闭、失业潮进一步恶化。

　　与此同时，此起彼伏的官民暴力冲突（群体性事件），不但威胁了社会稳定和人心，官方舆论在反省时也远比以前深刻。中新网前天转载评论文章就直截了当地批评说：“接二连三发生的群体事件说明，我们的社会不满的情绪在逐渐增长，政府往往应对无策，很少防患于未然。千篇一律的官样文章，把事件描述为被少数别有用心的人煽动利用，导致局面十分难堪，而政府却百般忍耐，以大局为重，尽摆出一副很无辜的样子。”

　　事实上，中国内部不但正忙着应付各种棘手的经济、社会、政治挑战，也在积极思考如何摆脱困局，丝毫没有彭定康眼中的对世界“民主灭亡”的威胁；倒过来看，中国社会可能还试图朝着更“民主”的方向发展，以缓解当前的危机。新版的中国威胁论显然最后也将沦为无稽之谈，倒是中国社会自身的努力，反而可能因此而失去外界应有的关注。

　　

　　November 18, 2008 -- Updated 0300 GMT (1100 HKT) 　　Economist: China, India criticalSTORY HIGHLIGHTS

　　IMF projects China's economy will grow 9.7 percent this year, India's 7.8

　　In China and India, a production drop in 2009 would be softer than rich nations

　　The U.S. economy is projected to shrink to -0.7 percent next year

　　IMF says emerging economies will make up world's 2.2 percent growth next year

　　 India and China's ability to resist the global economic slowdown will greatly influence whether the crisis drags the world into a depression, a top Pacific Rim trade community economist said Tuesday.

　　"If China and India come through this crisis with very good growth rates that would be very important for the rise of global economy," Bob Buckle told reporters on the eve of a summit of the 21-nation Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

　　The International Monetary Fund has said emerging economies -- which include China and India -- will account for the world's entire projected 2.2 percent overall growth next year.

　　It estimates rich nations' economies will together grow by just 0.1 percent this year while the developing world will grow by 5 percent.

　　China's economy has grown feverishly, in the double digits annually for 15 years while India's has grown at slightly less than 10 percent. Together, the two countries have about 40 percent of the world's people.

　　The IMF readjusted its growth estimates last month, projecting that China's economy would grow 9.7 percent this year and 8.5 percent in 2009. India's is estimated to grow 7.8 percent and 6.3 percent, respectively.

　　In both countries, the production drop would be far softer than rich countries. The economy of the United States, where the crisis originated, is projected to shrink to -0.7 percent next year with the euro-zone similar.

　　Don't Miss

　　CNN/Money: U.S. automakers plead for bailout 　　Citigroup to cut more than 50,000 jobs 　　Official: Weakness in China's economy worsening
　　Blog: China wants citizens to spend

　　China, India, Russia and Brazil currently have the world's largest cash reserves and at last weekend's G-20 summit in Washington they demanded a greater say in world economic and political forums.

　　Of the four, only China and Russia are APEC members. But the host of last week's summit, U.S. President George W. Bush will be in Lima to work with them on finding a way out of the crisis.

　　APEC has just three Latin American members and their projected growth rates for 2009 are Peru with 9 percent, possibly the region's highest, Chile with 4 percent and Mexico with about 1 percent.

　　There is a prevailing opinion among APEC's members, whose economies account for 60 percent of global economic growth, that all trade protection should be removed, said Buckle, a New Zealander who heads its economic committee.

　　"The reasons for this I think are very clear. If economies do embark on protectionist measures, that tends to have a more negative effect on the global situation," he said. " We saw that in the 1930's when the economies responded to the international crisis at that time by putting up trade barriers."

　　At last weekend's Washington summit, the G-20 presidents (of rich and major developing nations) agreed to take whatever action necessary to stabilize the financial system.
　　Next Article in World Business ? 　　 READ 　　 VIDEO
　　LIMA, Peru (AP) -- India and China's ability to resist the global economic slowdown will greatly influence whether the crisis drags the world into a depression, a top Pacific Rim trade community economist said Tuesday.

　　"If China and India come through this crisis with very good growth rates that would be very important for the rise of global economy," Bob Buckle told reporters on the eve of a summit of the 21-nation Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

　　The International Monetary Fund has said emerging economies -- which include China and India -- will account for the world's entire projected 2.2 percent overall growth next year.

　　It estimates rich nations' economies will together grow by just 0.1 percent this year while the developing world will grow by 5 percent.

　　China's economy has grown feverishly, in the double digits annually for 15 years while India's has grown at slightly less than 10 percent. Together, the two countries have about 40 percent of the world's people.

　　The IMF readjusted its growth estimates last month, projecting that China's economy would grow 9.7 percent this year and 8.5 percent in 2009. India's is estimated to grow 7.8 percent and 6.3 percent, respectively.

　　In both countries, the production drop would be far softer than rich countries. The economy of the United States, where the crisis originated, is projected to shrink to -0.7 percent next year with the euro-zone similar.

　　Don't Miss

　　CNN/Money: U.S. automakers plead for bailout 　　Citigroup to cut more than 50,000 jobs 　　Official: Weakness in China's economy worsening
　　Blog: China wants citizens to spend

　　China, India, Russia and Brazil currently have the world's largest cash reserves and at last weekend's G-20 summit in Washington they demanded a greater say in world economic and political forums.

　　Of the four, only China and Russia are APEC members. But the host of last week's summit, U.S. President George W. Bush will be in Lima to work with them on finding a way out of the crisis.

　　APEC has just three Latin American members and their projected growth rates for 2009 are Peru with 9 percent, possibly the region's highest, Chile with 4 percent and Mexico with about 1 percent.

　　There is a prevailing opinion among APEC's members, whose economies account for 60 percent of global economic growth, that all trade protection should be removed, said Buckle, a New Zealander who heads its economic committee.

　　"The reasons for this I think are very clear. If economies do embark on protectionist measures, that tends to have a more negative effect on the global situation," he said. " We saw that in the 1930's when the economies responded to the international crisis at that time by putting up trade barriers."

　　China's growth to slow, World Bank says
　　China's growth will slow to 7.5 percent next year -- the lowest rate since 1990 -- as the global financial crisis takes a greater toll on the world's fourth-largest economy, the World Bank said Tuesday. full story